and to American unilateralism. In other words, if earlier efforts were motivated by the hope of transforming a former enemy into a friend, recent efforts were mostly about coming together in the face of a common adversary. In January 2003, when Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder met in Paris to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, the notion of a common adversary was clearly on people's minds. During this meeting, Chirac adopted Schröder's position against the war in Iraq and the two leaders issued a joint statement of their strong opposition to a U.S. invasion. This statement was the impetus for Donald Rumsfeld's coining of the term "Old Europe," which undoubtedly only served to promote a stronger sense of Franco-German solidarity.
Before turning to an analysis of how and why French people imagined Françallemagne in recent years, it should be mentioned that in many ways a Franco-German identity is conceptually similar to that of a European identity, because its sense of community has less to do with tangible connections than with an imagined set of mutually agreed upon values. 3 In the early 1980s, the term "national character" was replaced with "national identity," which in turn was replaced by the term "cultural identity" in the mid 1990s. Fears of being associated with racist, essentialist ideas have motivated this evolution in terminology; and to some degree, the growing sense of a European cultural identity stems from the fact that it has allowed people to be freed from the nationalist assumptions that accompany discussions of national identity, especially since in explanations of what makes up a European identity there has been "a valorization of an ideal of the civic, universalist side of the equation in the attempt to bypass what [might be referred to as] 'the affective.'" 4 Franco-Germanness lies somewhere between national identity, a Gemeinshaft, or ethnic community, on the one hand and an abstract European cultural identity, a Gesellschaft, a sociopolitical entity grounded neither in geography nor ethnicity on the other. 5
How Franco-Germanness was Imagined in Recent Years
Getting French people to imagine Franco-Germanness has involved several interconnected pedagogical strategies. First, it has been necessary to foster a shared sense of "here" (within Françallemagne) and "there" (outside the imagined community), or of "us" and "them." Second, the shared culture of the two countries has not been described as something new, but as something that has always existed and is merely being uncovered or "remembered."
Remembering a shared past is an important part of imagining a community; equally important, however, is the effort to forget those events of the past that affected members of the imagined community differently. As Ernest Renan reminds us in his classic lecture at the Sorbonne from March 1882, Qu'est-ce qu'une nation: "… the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things. No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an Alan, a Taifale, or a Visigoth, yet every French citizen has to have forgotten the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, or the massacres that took place in the Midi in the thirteenth century." 6 These different strategies are all employed in the various media described in the sections that follow, though each media form has tended to privilege one strategy over the others. In the case of Arte News, for example, the most important contribution to a sense of Franco-Germanness has been in establishing a sense of "here" and "there." For the show Karambolage, it has been mostly about "remembering" what the two countries share, while the most important function of the new Franco-German textbook has been to encourage these two populations to forget diverging memories of the past.
For each of the three media forms examined below, the underlying argument is that these most recent efforts for cultural rapprochement differ in important ways from previous attempts to bring France and Germany closer. Since World War II, initiatives to bring France and Germany closer have consisted mostly of introducing the culture of one country to the other: beginning in the 1950s, students in one country were encouraged to learn the language and history of the other; "town twinning" matched up cities on either side of the Rhine in order to promote touristic and professional exchanges; films and music from one country were celebrated with cultural festivals in the other; "Franco-German Societies" brought performances of classic French theater to Germany. 7 Yet in all these cases, the underlying notion that German and French cultures were different was taken as a given. Indeed, these kinds of initiatives may have served to reify a sense of essential difference between the two countries even as the two populations became more knowledgeable of and friendlier toward one another. The point of analyzing excerpts from these three media forms in the sections that follow is to see how the most recent efforts (post-2003) have not been so much to teach one country about the differences of the other country, as to blur distinctions between the two cultures and to encourage people in both France and Germany to imagine a new kind of identity, one built primarily on an awareness of a shared culture.
One additional difference between earlier efforts and current efforts to bring France and
Germany closer stems from the fact that these most recent efforts are mediatized. This development is important for a number of reasons, all of which highlight why current efforts are more capable of blurring distinctions between the two cultures than were previous efforts. First, postwar efforts, which focused on student exchanges and tourism between the two countries, brought one population into direct contact with the other. To the extent that it would be hard to equate a French person's experience of visiting Germany with a German's experience of visiting France, each population's experience would be necessarily different from the other's. Twentyfirst century efforts, however, lead both peoples toward a more similar experience by bringing them into contact with a single, shared culture. Second, travel is commonly associated with a way to get away from one's own environment, to encounter something different, and to learn about others, whereas the experience of watching television is associated with the familiar, since it is frequently consumed in one's own cultural space and on one's own terms. Third, for French and German people not fluent in both languages, linguistic differences are brought to the forefront when visiting the other country. With the new mediatized texts, however, each population consumes the cultural information in its own language-indeed, while watching Arte, French people can have the "experience" of Germans speaking French fluently through dubbing, as linguistic difference fades into the background. And finally, the internet, along with television stations broadcast around the world by satellite, have caused people to become accustomed to the idea of media unconstrained by national borders. Increased familiarity with placeless media forms has paved the way for mediatized texts less defined by national identities and for the imagining of new communities like Françallemagne.
Arte News Creates a Sense of "Here" and "There" Two terms are useful for categorizing the means by which information is delivered to viewers via television news: mediation and dissemination. Dissemination refers to seemingly unmoderated feeds from primary sources with little commentary. Stations that broadcast across national borders, such as CNN International, tend to be good examples of the dissemination news style. Mediation, on the other hand, relies on some kind of interpreter, either in the form of a news anchor or journalist, to explain why and how the information delivered is relevant to a particular community of viewers, who are left with the sense that the information provided is not necessarily universal. In interpreting information for a specific community, the mediation news style fosters a sense of "here" vs. "there" and of "us" vs. "them." Local news programs provide good examples of this style of news delivery.
In 1992, Arte began broadcasting in France and in Germany; and in the beginning, the evening news privileged dissemination over mediation. Jean Michel Utard, who has written on the history of Arte, explains that in the station's early years "the channel thus seem[ed] to erase itself, or at least present[ed] itself as a transparent place, where the words pronounced [were] not its own. Consequently, the author and the viewer appear[ed] to be put into relation without any mediation, the author assuming full responsibility for the message." 8 It may have been simply that the channel could not mediate for a community that did not yet necessarily exist. It needed to work first on bringing that community into existence. As a former employee of Arte remarked in 1993, "Franco-German friendship … doesn't exist. But because it seems desirable, we have to fabricate it." 9 It makes sense then that until Franco-Germanness became imaginable in the minds of viewers, the station's cultural and national identities would remain somewhat vague.
Adding to Arte's blurred identity was the fact that it was difficult to show anything truly controversial concerning France or Germany. While watching Arte in France for example, a France, the idea that television can, and even should, be used to shape collective identities is not new.
In November, Arte indicated that it would be making changes to its programming along the lines of the recommendations set out in Chirac and Schröder's joint statement, which involved producing new Franco-German programming, including the show Karambolage, but also pushing the station's news style toward greater mediation and a more explicit articulation of the channel's Franco-German identity. Victor Rocaries, Arte's program director at the time, summarized the new programming in terms of "legibility, homogeneity, proximity" including the addition of "more anchor people to create a warmer, more human, connection." 13 Jérôme Clément, the president of Arte, added that "with the new programming line, Arte is confirming its will to interpret current events in a complex world, … to explain the fundamental questions linked to the future of the planet, … to explain the history that contributes to our identity and to open the mind." 14 The italicized terms in the statements above indicate, some more explicitly than others, the move toward greater mediation.
Following the programming changes in 2003, French and German newscasters began to alternate weekly on Arte News (the language difference was resolved through simultaneous dubbing). Françallemagne became increasingly imaginable as both French and Germans anchors used expressions such as "here" or "us" freely to refer to the two countries collectively, encouraging viewers to think that they were part of a single community. It is significant that on this new incarnation of Arte News, politicians outside of France or Germany are referred to with their names, titles, and nationality (for example, "British Prime Minister Tony Blair"), while important figures in France and Germany are referred to only by name and title without any mention of nationality (for example, "President Sarkozy") or at times only by last names (for example, "Merkel"). 15 Arte News blurs the differences between France and Germany when making geographical references as well, with newscasters casually referring to regions in two countries, such as Saxony, Burgundy, the Black Forest or Normandy, without specifying in which country they are located. When referring to regions in other countries, however, the newscaster will specify the country by name (for example, "Tuscany, Italy"). This rather subtle editorial policy encourages viewers to think of the interior borders of Françallemagne as concurrent with the borders of the two countries' regions, rather than split down the middle by the Rhine.
A comparison of Arte News with a second European news source, the channel Euronews, provides an interesting contrast to Arte's move toward greater mediation. Euronews is an extreme example of disseminated, non-mitigated news. A video feed of the day's news is broadcast in each country where Euronews is available, with an off-camera voice providing narration for the images in the country's own language; indeed, viewers never see a human face recounting the events. At the end of each thirty-minute broadcast, Euronews shows a segment called "No Comment," where a short news-feed from the day is broadcast with no narration whatsoever.
In addition to these differences in style, Arte and Euronews also differ in content.
Though both channels' news programs devote approximately two-thirds of their time to Europe (Table 1) , Arte focuses much more than Euronews on France and Germany, often portrayed as the core of Europe. Indeed, Arte News devotes only 39.6 percent of its European news coverage to non-French, non-German news, compared to 81.3 percent for Euronews ( Figure 1 ). 16 This practice is a further sign of Arte's recent move toward greater mediation as it reinforces for its viewers an implicit sense of "here" and "there." share. This lighthearted show-a sort of contemporary Tour de la Françallemagne par deux enfants-provides insight into everyday customs in the two countries and has been unexpectedly successful, with 550,000 viewers now tuning into the program each week. 17 The overall coverage of the two countries on Karambolage is balanced. In the first 120 episodes there were 112 segments concerned with primarily French subjects, 111 with primarily German ones, and 160 segments where the topic was part-French, part-German. The program relies on essentially three strategies to bring out traits that France and Germany share. These strategies are discussed below along with examples collected from the program's first 120 episodes.
The first type of strategy used to get Karambolage's French and German viewers to think about what they share involves the analysis of cultural products or practices that are only slightly different in the two countries. Here, the differences tend to be extremely subtle and are often trivialized, such that the differences seem similar to those that might exist among different regions within a single country. Examples of this strategy include segments on: (1) the chocolate-hazelnut spread, Nutella, in which the viewer learns that there are differences between German and French Nutella, but that the differences are minimal: "the color is basically the same, the German Nutella is just a bit darker … The German Nutella is dull, while the French Nutella is shiny. [With the German Nutella, one] must use a certain pressure to stick a knife in;
on the French side, it goes in just like it would in melted butter"; 18 (2) cigarette rolling papers, which are a bit thicker in Germany than in France, with the narrator concluding that "it is always in the smallest of things that difference resides"; 19 (3) the "Döner Kebab," a Turko-German dish, whose French counterpart has one small difference; it is served with French fries: "a German could feel very much at home, when he happily discovers the flag of a Döner stand in Marseille or in Toulouse! Well not quite. Look closely. When he asks for a Döner … our German friend is going to witness a terrible sacrilege that will leave him baffled: the person making his delicious Döner will load it up with a mountain of, yes, French fries"; 20 (4) cutting bread in the two countries, in which the viewer learns that Germans tend to use an electric bread cutter in their homes while the French use knives or have it sliced at the bakery; though the overriding message is that bread is important in both countries; 21 (4) the expression "tête-à-tête," which is used in both countries to refer to a meeting between two people, though in Germany, it has more of a sexual or romantic connotation than it does France; 22 (5) April Fool's Day, which is associated with a specific animal in each country; with fish in France and with donkeys and cows in Germany; 23 (6) the use of plastic bags from grocery stores as garbage bags, which is common in both countries, though French people tend to hang them from any hook that might be available, while Germans often have a special device that holds them neatly in place; 24 and (7) formal and informal second-person pronouns, which exist in both the French and German languages, though the contexts in which one must use formal or informal pronouns are slightly different in the two countries. 25 The second strategy reinforces the idea of a shared cultural heritage by highlighting the existence of hybrid objects or expressions whose origins are part French, part German. Examples of the hybrid strategy include: (1) the word kaput, which looks like it comes from German, but the word is originally from the French verb "capoter" (used to describe a ship that tips over);
now with its Germanized spelling, the word is used in both languages to refer to something broken, such that both cultures have played a role in the word's evolution; 26 and (2) 30 and (4) French horse butchers, which are becoming rarer as fewer French people eat horse meat: "So come on, eat some horse! We love these horse butchers too much, with their signs, their wonderful retro look. Go ahead, make a little effort, they are in the process of closing one after another. Let's save them!" 31 and (5) the French concierge, which is described as becoming less and less common to the point of becoming "an endangered species." 32 For objects like these that are becoming increasingly rare, the significance of the difference is trivialized, to the extent that the object seems almost as strange, irrelevant, or confusing to natives as it does to foreigners.
Finally, in addition to the segments presenting French and German cultural objects outlined above, at the end of every episode of Karambolage is a guessing game, or "devinette."
Viewers are shown a short video of an ordinary place that is located either in France or Germany and are encouraged to find a clue, such as a uniform, a sign or other object that is only found in one of the two countries, which would indicate in which country the scene was filmed. The clues are subtle. Indeed, French television critics have commented that finding the answer is "not as easy as one might think" 33 and that the puzzle can be "fairly aggravating, since it is often unsolvable." 34 For viewers who are unable to figure out in which country the scene was filmed, the consequence of course is that they are left with the impression that France and Germany are more similar than they might have otherwise thought. The editors explain in the conclusion that the goal of the book was "to show that well before the antagonism from the war of 1870, affinities between the two countries were numerous and cultural and commercial exchanges were constant; even during the period of antagonism, many French and German people resisted the propaganda of the time and maintained their free will." 38 This new book represents a strong break from the ways in which history has traditionally been recounted in the two countries' textbooks. Even with respect to historical events or people that could easily be considered a part of both countries' histories, French and German textbooks have told different stories. For example, though both countries have included Charlemagne in their respective histories, "in French textbooks, Charlemagne had reconstructed the Roman empire; in German textbooks, he had founded the German Reich…" 39 Thus, with each country emphasizing its unique connection to the Holy Roman Empire, Charlemagne can be presented in both France and Germany as a national, rather than a shared, bi-national lieu de mémoire.
Histoire/Geschichte Forgets What's Different
What immediately stands out in the new Franco-German history textbook is that the memory or World War II is recounted in a surprisingly similar way for both countries, such that coming to terms with the memory of Vichy France is equated with coming to terms with the memory of Nazi Germany. A number of reviews of the textbook have pointed out that "it is regrettable that the SS, authors of the crimes of Oradour-sur-Glane, are associated with 'the Vichy syndrome.'" 40 The idea of connecting the two countries' memories of the war is of course a strong break with the ways in which the memory of the war has traditionally been treated, with
German textbooks normally focusing on accepting guilt and responsibility for the war, and percent on average for the French textbooks). 48 French books also all devote less space to Communism and life in the Eastern Bloc than the Franco-German book does (9.1 percent for the Franco-German book, 5.9 percent on average for the French textbooks)-a result of the efforts on the part of German historians to draw attention to the crimes of Communist regimes. 49 In order to build the case that each country has its own specific form of war guilt, the Franco-German book spends more time discussing the memory and consequences of the Second World War than the French books do. The Franco-German book also devotes much more space to issues currently facing the European Union as a whole (9.1 percent for the Franco-German book versus 5.8 percent on average for the French textbooks). 50 In fact, the two questions might be considered two sides of the same coin. As will be argued below, the question of why Françallemagne was imagined recently has much to do with the perception of a shared adversary in the form of the Bush administration and its war in Iraq, while previous efforts to bring France and Germany closer had more to do with turning a previous enemy into a friend. The goal of transforming a former enemy into a friend carries an implicit message of difference, and the notion of essential otherness between the two former enemies is likely to persist for some time even as the two work together to foster a degree of tolerance for one another by learning more about one another. However, when the motivation for rapprochement stems for a need to unite in the face of common adversary, it becomes possible for the two communities to put aside their differences and to see how similar they are, especially in relation to the relative difference of the external adversary.
History provides examples to support the idea that it becomes more likely for individual communities to forget differences among themselves, to recognize what they share, and to imagine themselves as part of a single community when they are faced with a common, external enemy. As Jean-Baptiste Duroselle has pointed out, the peoples of Europe have for centuries seen the extent to which they perceive themselves as different from or similar to one another go in cycles that mirror the extent to which enemies are thought to be internal or external to the continent. 51 Charles Martel's victory in Poitiers against the Arab invaders, the Turkish conquest of Constantinople, and the European "discovery" of tribes in the Americas were all moments when the peoples of the European continent were able to see a bit more clearly the similarity of their cultures. However, when the enemy was to be found within the continent, for example during the Thirty Years' War, the Napoleonic wars, or the Franco-Prussian War, people were likely to think in terms of more local identities.
Why Franco-Germanness was Imagined in Recent Years
The notion that collective identity can be shaped through education is nothing new to France, a country that already had an important experience with nation-building in the schools of the Third Germany, however, has had a very different approach to disseminating its culture, since "the events of the Third Reich led to considerable circumspection after the war." 66 This has meant that "for some time the Germans presented a low profile to the world in respect of their way of life," and that there has been a "greater emphasis on contemporary life in the Federal Republic, as opposed to the German cultural heritage in general [and that] the German government has now moved to a rather different concept of cultural policy as such, with the emphasis on collaboration with other states." 67 Consequently, though the articulations of Franco-Germanness in the media forms presented here have been similar in both countries, differences in the ways in which national identity is conceived have meant that the notion of Françallemagne has resonated differently on either side of the Rhine: the French have tended to look at it as a broader space for propagating French universalist ideals, while in Germany, the motivation might be understood in more ethnic terms, as a way to be less "German" and to distance oneself from the memory of World War II.
In the end, there are several reasons to expect the importance of the Franco-German friendship to wane in the coming years. Already, the term "Franco-German" is appearing with less and less frequency in both countries' newspapers, and the idealistic projects set out in 2003, such as the effort to create a single citizenship for both countries, have lost steam. Also, the two countries' current leaders, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, are less interested in pursuing the Franco-German friendship than their predecessors were. Moreover, there is the long-term trend of post-reunification Germany becoming less interested in the Franco-German friendship as it both moves beyond its war guilt and develops relationships with other countries, notably to the East. After decades of being weaker than France, Germany emerged as the more powerful political partner in the 1990s and Germans have begun to realize that there are times when it is in Germany's interest to act independently. As Julius Friend explains in his book Unequal Partners:
As long as Germany was burdened by the immediate memory of World War II, and even after it recovered full sovereignty in 1955, France was the leading partner. By 1968 German economic superiority was manifest, but France could consider with more or less good reason until unification that it had political trumps that Germany did not possess. Unification made it plain to most of the French that these trumps-membership in the Four-Power Council for Germany, a UN Security Council seat, even atomic armaments-had lost much of their value in the relation with Germany. 68 Finally, the anti-Americanism that fueled the recent surge in Franco-Germanness in the two countries may be fading, particularly in Germany. Anti-Americanism seems to be somewhat more endemic to France than Germany, which could suggest that Franco-Germanness will continue to be imagined in France for a longer period of time than in Germany. A comparison of the number of times the term "Franco-German" appeared in French and German newspapers The numbers on the left side show the number of times "Irak" appeared in the text of an article or in a headline and the numbers on the right are for the number of times the term "Deutsch-Französisch(e)" appeared in the text of an article or in a headline. Table 3 . Correlations between the frequency with which the term "Franco-German" appears in each country's newspapers and the frequency with which other terms appear from 2001 through 2008
Correlation between the frequency of "Franco-German" and the frequency of:
French Newspapers German Newspapers "Iraq" 0.91 0.83 "United States" 0.66 0.47
However, the correlations between the frequency of the appearance of the terms "Franco-German" and "the United States" (0.66 correlation in French newspapers, 0.47 in German newspapers) show that these associations are a bit weaker in both countries, though less so in France than in Germany. 70 These numbers suggest that the component of Franco-German 
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